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ARGUMENT
A&A challenge the trial court's determination, in the March 1,2010 Order, that A&A' s
June 2000 release with Robena of claims relating to their services in support of the operation
of the Robena plant was a complete release by A&A of their claims to payment from CoBon
under the Consulting Agreement for the development of nine synfuel plant projects, only one
of which was the development of what became the Robena plant (A&A's Claims).1 Two
facts, unchallenged by CoBon, establish that the June 2000 Release was not a release of
A&A's Claims under settled rules of controlling Pennsylvania law. First, when A&A gave
that release, as "Viron," there was no dispute pending concerning CoBon's then completely
inchoate (future) duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. Instead, the June 2000
Release settled only a dispute concerning Robena's duty to pay Viron four months of a
$15,000 monthly fee that had not been required under the Consulting Agreement, but under
a completely separate contract. Second, CoBon did not repudiate its duty to pay A&A under
the Consulting Agreement until over two years after Viron gave the release.
A&A's Claims are for breach of CoBon's duty to pay under CoBon's and A&A's
Consulting Agreement for A&A's services rendered to CoBon under that contract. Under
the Consulting Agreement, A&A were to: (1) assist and support CoBon in finding and
obtaining sites to build synfuel plants, coal feedstock sources for the plants and contracts for
the sale of synfuel, all of which were part of the development of synfuel plants, and (2) assist
CoBon in the sale of synfuel plants that were developed to companies looking to claim the
1

Capitalized terms have the same meaning as in A&A's Appellants' Brief. Citations
to "Tab" and to the record are the same as in Appellants' Brief.
1

significant Section 29 tax credits that the plants could generate. (Tab C at §§ 1.0,1.2,1.3.)
By the date of the June 2000 Release, A&A had assisted CoBon under the Consulting
Agreement in the successful development of six synfuel plants (including the Robena plant).
(Tabs AA, BB.) However, until September 2001, CoBon's duty to pay A&A for their
services remained completely inchoate. CoBon had to pay for A&A's services only if and
when CoBon received proceeds from synfuel facilities. A&A's fees under the Consulting
Agreement were 30 percent of CoBon's actual proceeds over the course of the Section 29 tax
credit program from synfuel facilities that were successfully developed and sold. (Tab C at
§§2.0,2.4,3.0.)
In May 2000, just before Viron executed the Robena release, CoBon actually paid
advances to A&A under the Consulting Agreement based upon CoBon's "anticipated"
receipt of proceeds from five of the synfuel plants. (Tabs W, X.) Not until September 2001
did CoBon actually begin receiving distributable proceeds and, to date, CoBon has received
at least $66,000,000 of such proceeds. (Tab Y at AA004282; 1810.) In November and
December 2001, over a year after Viron gave its release to Robena, CoBon actually made
payments to A&A based upon its actual receipt of proceeds that CoBon expressly recognized
were "distributable" to A&A under the Consulting Agreement. {Id.) However, in November
2002, over two years after Viron gave the Robena release, CoBon completely repudiated its
duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement on a going-forward basis, based upon
some unspecified alleged change in the tax laws. (Tab Z.) CoBon, at that time, did not even
hint that the Robena release had discharged its duty to pay A&A. {Id.) CoBon's repudiation
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prompted A&A to first assert claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement.
Rather than settle a dispute concerning CoBon's then-inchoate duty to pay A&A under
the Consulting Agreement, the June 2000 Release settled only a dispute concerning Robena's
duty to pay Viron $15,000 per month for services performed for the then-operating Robena
plant (A&A were called "Viron" in connection with the $15,000 per month services to
Robena). (Tab B.) Events leading to the June 2000 Release started in March 1998, when
A&A, as Viron, offered to assist in the operation of the Robena plant for a monthly fee not
due under the Consulting Agreement (because the proposed operational services to Robena
were not for the development or sale of the plant). (Tabs F, AA at ^103-105).) The
proposed services primarily were assisting Robena in obtaining short-term feedstock for the
Robena plant' s operation pending completion of the wash facility that would enable the plant
to optimally use the long-term feedstock source that A&A had assisted CoBon in obtaining
as part of the plant's development. (Id.) In April-May 1998, CoBon disputed Viron's
entitlement to the monthly fee. (Tabs G-K.) CoBon took and initially reserved the position
that Viron's assistance in obtaining short-term feedstock was required as part of A&A's
development services under the Consulting Agreement.

(Id.) Nevertheless, Robena

separately agreed, in the July 1, 1998 agreement, to pay Viron a $15,000 monthly fee for
short-term feedstock services. (Tab D.) This was after CoBon had sold Robena to Providian,
which had acquired Robena in order to be able to claim the anticipated Section 29 tax credits.
(Tab AA at ^[114, 6548 at Exs. 386, 470.)
As repeatedly and expressly acknowledged by CoBon, Viron fully performed for
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Robena not only the short-term feedstock services Robena originally contracted for, but also
extensive management services that CoBon never claimed to be due under its Consulting
Agreement with A&A. CoBon, for example, after Palmer became the manager of Robena,
represented to Palmer as follows:
[Viron's short-term feedstock] services was later refined to also include
interceding and assisting as required to resolve union labor issues, assisting with
permit compliance and obtaining new permits as required for operation of the
wash plant, assisting with [the IRS private letter ruling] issues, meeting with
operations personnel to identify and address operations problems, and arranging
for all raw material coal fines and final product coal pellet testing.... [CoBon]
understood that Palmer would continue to utilize Viron in this capacity after it
assumed management responsibilities.
(Tab U at 4.) This, of course, was far beyond anything required of A&A in the Consulting
Agreement to develop a plant to the point it could be sold and operated. (Tab C at §1.2.)
However, in May 1999, Robena stopped paying its outside vendors, including Viron,
and, on July 1, 1999, Providian replaced CoBon with Palmer as the manager of Robena.
(Tabs M, AA atffifl17, 123; 6548 at Ex. 736).) By that time, and onward, CoBon was a
staunch proponent of Viron getting paid by Robena, stating Viron was performing valuable
services in support of the operation of the Robena plant. (6548 at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731;
Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.) Robena, however, continued not to pay. (Id.)
By September 1, 1999, when Viron provided notice of termination of its services,
Robena owed Viron $60,000 - the last four months of the $ 15,000 monthly fee. (6548 at Ex.
763; Tabs P, AA at Tf 127.) Viron then sued Robena, not CoBon, in the Pennsylvania action
for just payment of the $60,000. (Tab S.) It was just this dispute that was settled by the June
2000 Release. (Tab B.) This claim did not arise under the Consulting Agreement, as that
4

contract had not provided for A&A to get paid a $ 15,000 monthly fee. (Tab C.) Instead, the
dispute concerned Robena's duty, created by only the separate July 1,1998 agreement, to pay
Viron that fee. (Tab D.) During the pendency of Viron's Pennsylvania action and its
settlement with the June 2000 Release, there was not even the suggestion of a dispute
concerning CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab AA at ff 129,
135, 144.) CoBon had not challenged A&A's then-inchoate, future right to be paid under
the Consulting Agreement. (Id.) CoBon had not repudiated its then-inchoate, future duty to
pay A&A once it received proceeds from the six fully developed plants. (Id.) Indeed, while
Viron's Pennsylvania action was pending, CoBon paid A&A advances based upon
CoBon's "anticipated" receipt of distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement.
(Tabs W, X, AA at TJ144.) In light of the absence of any dispute concerning CoBon's duty
to pay when Viron gave the Robena release, and given the release's lack of mention of any
claims under the Consulting Agreement, the release could not bar A&A's claims to payment
under the Consulting Agreement under Pennsylvania law.
Only late in Appellees' Brief (at pages 34-48) does CoBon finally present its argument
and interpretation of the June 2000 Release as a release of A&A's Claims to payment under
the Consulting Agreement, which indisputedly had been inchoate at the time Viron gave the
release. CoBon's argument rests upon its theory that, because Viron mistakenly had alleged
in its Pennsylvania complaint against Robena that its contract with Robena was the May 8,
1998 letter (in which CoBon had protested Viron getting paid the $15,000 monthly fee),
Viron's Pennsylvania action against Robena allegedly was against CoBon and somehow
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involved CoBon's and A&A's April-May 1998 dispute as to whether A&A were entitled to
the $15,000 monthly fee. According to CoBon, because the April-May 1998 dispute had
concerned whether Viron's short-term feedstock services to Robena had been due under the
Consulting Agreement, the June 2000 Release somehow settled all possible disputes under
the Consulting Agreement.
CoBon's interpretation and theory are neither legally nor factually credible. CoBon
fails to acknowledge the settled rules of Pennsylvania law regarding the application of
releases that determine this appeal. CoBon's theory is no answer to the fact that the June
2000 Release did not expressly state it covered potential claims arising after it was executed,
as necessary under Pennsylvania law for it to have been a release of future A&A's Claims.
CoBon ignores that CoBon's and A&A's April-May 1998 dispute concerned only Viron's
entitlement to be paid $15,000 per month by Robena. CoBon had merely objected to Viron
getting paid $15,000 by Robena for short-term feedstock services that CoBon claimed
already were due under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs F-K) CoBon does not contend the
dispute was broader in scope and this was all the trial court found to be the subject of the
April-May 1998 dispute. (Tab A at Findings 1fl[3-4.) The April-May 1998 dispute did not
concern A&A" s right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon had not challenged
in any manner A&A's then-inchoate right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement. That
dispute could not have given rise to a claim by CoBon in the Pennsylvania action that A&A
had breached the Consulting Agreement under CoBon's April-May 1998 position that
Viron's short-term feedstock services were required under that contract. Indeed, CoBon
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repeatedly acknowledged that Viron had fully performed not only those short-term feedstock
services, but also the additional services to the operation of the Robena plant that CoBon
never claimed were required under the Consulting Agreement (e.g., assisting in labor
disputes, permitting and day-to-day operational issues).
As such, even under CoBon's theory that Viron's Pennsylvania action had involved the
April-May 1998 dispute, that action still would have involved only Robena's duty to pay
Viron the $15,000 monthly fee, and not CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting
Agreement. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the June 2000 Release still could not have been
a release by A&A of claims for payment by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement.
I.

The Fact That The June 2000 Release Did Not Expressly State It Covered Claims
Accruing After Its Execution Meant It Did Not Cover A&A's Claims Under The
Consulting Agreement, Which Accrued After Viron Gave The Release
CoBon ignores the "cardinal rule of construction requiring that releases be strictly

construed so as to not bar the enforcement of claims not yet accrued at the date of
execution." Vaughn v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (emphasis added);
see also Henry Shenk Co. v. City of Erie, 43 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 1945) (stating same rule); In
re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1940) (same); Zurich Gen. Ace. andLiab. Ins. Co. v.
Klein, 121 A.2d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (same).2
This "cardinal rule" means a release may potentially bar inchoate claims only by
actually expressly stating it covers claims that may arise in the future, and not upon
interpretation of the release's general language. See Restifo v. McDonald, 230 A.2d 199,201
2

CoBon concedes the release settled a Pennsylvania lawsuit and, by its express terms,
is to be interpreted under Pennsylvania law. (Tab B at ^8.)
7

(Pa. 1967) ("[T]he general words of the release will not be construed so as to bar the
enforcement of a claim which has not accrued at the date of the release."); In re Brill's
Estate, 12 A.2d 50 at 52 (stating same rule).
Several appellate decisions applying Pennsylvania law demonstrate the kind of language
that must be present for a release to potentially bar claims accruing after execution of the
release. See Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 39 (all claims "the undersigned now has or hereafter may
have"); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 895 (3rd Cir. 1975) (all
claims the releasors "ever had, now have or which they or any of them hereafter can, shall
or may have"); Bickings v. Bethlehem Lukens Plate, 82 F. Supp.2d 402,406 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(all claims "whether known or unknown... that [releasor] ever had, now have or may have
or claim to have in the future").3
This "cardinal rule" is dispositive of this appeal regardless of the intended subject
matter scope of the June 2000 Release. The June 2000 Release did not expressly state it
covered potential claims that may accrue subsequent to Viron giving the release; it used no
language similar to that found in the releases at issue in Vaughn, Three Rivers Motors and
Bickings. To the contrary, Viron and Robena expressly stated in the June 2000 Release that
they released each other and the "Released Parties" only from:
any and all claims, counterclaims . . . which relate to or arise out of any consulting
services which have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic
Fuel Plant (the "Project") including, without limitation, claims asserted in, or that
could have been asserted in, [Viron's Pennsylvania action].
3

CoBon misstates Three Rivers Motors as an example of a release covered possible
future claims without expressly stating the release covers possible future claims. (Aplee. Br.
atn.31.)
8

(TabB at 1131-30.)
The release9 s lack of language expressly stating it covered potential claims arising after
its execution is fatal to CoBon's allegation that the June 2000 Release bars A&A's Claims
for payment under the Consulting Agreement. Those claims did not accrue until, at the
earliest, November 2002, over two years after Viron entered into the June 2000 Release.
This is when CoBon first repudiated its duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement.
(Tab Z.) Without the required language, it would be "unreasonable in fact as it would be
unwarranted law" to hold that Viron's June 2000 release of claims to payment for its services
to Robena was intended to constitute a release of claims to payment for different services
under a different contract with a different party arising almost two and a half years after
Viron gave the release. See Henry Shenk, 43 A.2d at 102; Klein, 121 A.2d at 894-96.
CoBon argues the release bars claims "regardless of when such claims... might be said
to accrue" because (1) the release phrases "any and all" and "relating to or arising out o f are
comprehensive and allegedly "forward-looking," (2) the release's subject matter clause
("consulting services which have been performed by Viron ...") is stated in the past tense,
and (3) the release's inclusion clause mentions claims that "could have been" brought in the
Pennsylvania action. (Aplee. Br. at 44.) CoBon also relies upon the fact that the release
"does not limit the time within which a claim must be filed" and argues that, "as in virtually
all releases, the language expressly and impliedly anticipates the discharge of claims that
might be asserted in the future." (Id. at 45 (emphasis in original).)
CoBon plainly argues that the general language of the release covers claims regardless
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of when they come into existence, rather than cite any language expressly stating that future
claims then unknown were covered (i.e., language such as used in the releases at issue in
Vaughn, Three Rivers Motors and Bickings). CoBon's interpretation is clearly prohibited by
the Pennsylvania "cardinal rule" of strict construction.
Moreover, even were such an interpretation permitted, CoBon's interpretation is not
legally valid because the June 2000 Release did not use "forward-looking" language to state
the scope of claims being released. The release phrases "any and all" and "which relate to
or arise out o f are not "forward-looking" phrases. As a matter of law, they are references
only to existing claims. See, e.g., In re Brill 9s Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (viewing the similar
phrase "any and all manner of actions" to mean "a general settlement of all accounts up to
that time . . . . " ) . The fact that the subject matter clause is stated in the past tense confirms
Robena's and Viron's intent to limit the release to only their existing claims. This also is
confirmed by the reference in the inclusion clause to claims that could have been asserted in
Viron's Pennsylvania action. The Pennsylvania action could not have involved claims that
did not exist when it was pending.
CoBon's bare proposition that a release must be interpreted as covering future claims
unless the parties expressly limit the release to existing claims is directly contrary to the
Pennsylvania "cardinal rule" of strict construction, which provides a release can cover future
possible claims only by expressly stating it covers future possible claims.
Apparently recognizing the weakness of its interpretation, CoBon also argues that
A&A's Claims to payment by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement already had accrued
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by the time Viron entered into the June 2000 Release on June 28,2000. CoBon makes two
alternative arguments as to how A&A's Claims allegedly accrued before that date.
First, CoBon argues that the rule is that a claim for payment for services accrues when
the services are rendered, rather when the duty to pay is breached. CoBon plainly is wrong;
a claim for payment cannot accrue before the claimant's right to be paid ripens.4 Packer
Society Hill Travel Agency, Inc. v. Presbyterian Univ. ofPenn. Med. Ctr., 635 A.2d 649,652
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("In general, an action based on contract accrues at the time of
breach."). Instead, a claim for breach of a duty to pay for services accrues only when the
party having that duty breaches or repudiates it. See, e.g., id.; Total Control Inc. v. Danaher
Corp., 359 F. Supp.2d 387, 393-94 (E.D. Pa. 2005).5 In case of an anticipatory repudiation,
if the non-breaching party elects to treat the other party' s performance as completely due, the
claim for payment accrues at the time of election. Total Control, 359 F. Supp.2d at 393-94.
As of the date of the Robena release (June 28,2000), CoBon's duty to pay for A&A's
services under the Consulting Agreement was completely inchoate; CoBon had yet to receive
any distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab C at §§ 2.1,2.2; Tab Y.)

4

CoBon's two cases on this point, Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. v.
Energypro Constr. Partners, 271 A.D.2d 233,234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), and International
Potato Corp. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 602,604 (Ct. CI. 1958), are inapposite. Parsons
states the rule for when a design/construction project owner's claim for breach against a
professional service provider accrues, not when the service provider's claim for payment
accrues. International Potato merely stated a rule for accrual of a claim for payment upon
a sale of goods, where payment was due upon delivery of the goods.
5

CoBon's attempt to distinguish Total Control because it was a statute of limitations
case is baffling. The rule for accrual of claims is not different in statute of limitation cases
than other cases; a contract claim accrues upon the breach.
11

As such, A&A's claims to payment could have accrued by June 28,2000 only if CoBon had
anticipatorily repudiated its duty to pay A&A before that date. That never happened. At the
time Viron executed the release, there was not even the suggestion of a dispute regarding
CoBon's inchoate duty to pay A&A in the future.
Alternatively, CoBon argues that A&A's Claims already had accrued by June 28,2000
because Viron's Pennsylvania action against Robena allegedly involved CoBon's and A&A's
April-May 1998 dispute. Thus, according to CoBon, the Pennsylvania action was under the
Consulting Agreement such that all possible claims by A&A under the Consulting
Agreement had accrued and could have been presented in the Pennsylvania action.
There are two fatal flaws with this argument. First, as a matter of law, the accrual of
one claim under a contract does not result in the accrual of all potential claims under the
contract. This is demonstrated by the many release cases holding that a single claim, but not
other claims under the same contract, were released. See, e.g., Cady v. Mitchell, 220 A.2d
373,374-75 (Pa. Super. 1966); Cockeroft v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 189 A. 687,689 (Pa.
Super. 1937). Second, in April-May 1998, CoBon had not challenged in any manner, much
less repudiated, A&A's then-inchoate right to be paid under the Consulting Agreement.
(Tabs F-K.) Thus, even if the Pennsylvania action had involved the April-May 1998 dispute,
A&A's Claims still would not have accrued as of the time of the release.
IL

The Fact That, At The Time Viron Entered Into The June 2000 Release, There
Was No Dispute Between A&A And CoBon Regarding CoBon's Duty To Pay
A&A Under The Consulting Agreement Demonstrates The Error Of The March
1, 2010 Order Regardless Of The Language Used In The Release
CoBon ignores the rule under Pennsylvania law that, before a release can be found to
12

bar a particular claim, not only must the release language expressly provide it covers such
a claim, but the circumstances must demonstrate that the parties specifically had the
particular claim in mind and bargained for its release. "'It is a settled rule of construction
that an agreement comprehends only those things in respect to which it appears the
contracting parties proposed to contract, and not others they never thought of . . . The
release cannot be allowed to embrace anything beyond it. A release ordinarily covers only
such matters as may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when
it was given." Cockcroft, 189 A. at 689 (citations omitted); see also Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40
("'The courts of Pennsylvania have traditionally determined the effect of a release using the
ordinary meaning of its language and interpreted the release as covering "only such matters
as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the release
was given."'" (citation omitted, emphasis in original)); Restifo, 230 A.2d at 201 (stating same
rule has been recognized by "[a] long line of Pennsylvania cases"); Cady, 220 A.2d at 374
(stating same rule); Klein, \2\ A.2d at 896 (stating same rule).
"The surrounding circumstances clarify the intention ofthe parties and identify 'matters
which may be fairly said to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the
release was given.'"6 Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 406 (quoting Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40.) As
held in Restifo, the circumstances "must show that a release [of the claim] was bargained for
and within the parties' contemplation." 230 A.2d at 202.
Under this rule, even a release that expressly states it bars all existing claims does not
6

CoBon miscites the "within the contemplation of the parties" rule as concerning the
language of the release, when it actually concerns the circumstances of the release.
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bar a particular existing claim that the circumstances demonstrate was not within the
contemplation of the parties.7 See, e.g., Cady, 220 A.2d at 374-75 (holding that husband's
and wife's release of insurer "of any damage, loss or injury, which heretofore have been or
which hereafter may be sustained by us in consequence of [a car accident]" did not bar the
wife's injury claim from the same accident because the circumstances showed that the parties
had not contemplated a release of the wife's claim). Likewise, even a release that expressly
states it bars claims arising in the future does not bar a particular claim arising subsequent
to the release that the circumstances demonstrate was not within the contemplation of the
parties. See, e.g., Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40 (holding that an express release of all persons of
all known and unknown claims, including potential future claims, arising from a car accident
did not bar a claim that subsequently arose for medical malpractice resulting from treatment
of injuries from the accident because the circumstances showed that the parties had not
contemplated that claim). Facts that have been held to show a claim was not within the
contemplation of the parties include: (1) the claim had not accrued when the release was
given, (2) the only consideration for the release was an amount covering a separate
injury, (3) lack of knowledge of the claim when the release was given, and (4) lack of
discussion regarding the claim or the potential for the claim during the negotiation or closing
of the release. See, e.g., Cady, 220 A.2d at 375; Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40-41.

7

The exception is where the parties manifest an intent to settle all accounts, when the
release will be given effect even as to unknown claims that existed when the release was
given. See Three Rivers Motors, 522 F.2d at 896. This exception is not applicable here, as
the June 2000 Release did not expressly state it was a settlement of all accounts, including
unknown claims, and because A&A's Claims did not exist when Viron gave the release.
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Here, the circumstances conclusively demonstrate that, when they gave their mutual
release, Viron and Robena did not contemplate A&A's release of claims to payment under
the Consulting Agreement. A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement had
not yet accrued when Viron gave their release. CoBon's duty to pay had not yet become due
and CoBon had not anticipatorily repudiated that duty. (Tabs C at ffl[2.0, 2.4, 3.0, Y at
AA004285, Z.) At that time, there was not even the suggestion of a pending dispute
concerning CoBon's duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement if and when CoBon
received distributable proceeds; CoBon had not in any manner challenged A&A's right to
be paid and A&A had not made a demand to be paid. (Tab AA at Tft[135, 141-44.) Instead,
when Viron gave the release, A&A had every reason to believe they would be paid under the
Consulting Agreement once CoBon started receiving distributable proceeds, because CoBon
had just paid A&A advances, in May 2000, based upon its "anticipated" receipt of
distributable proceeds. (Tabs W, X.) A&A plainly did not even anticipate, at that time, they
might have to make a claim for payment under the Consulting Agreement for their 3 0 percent
of the proceeds CoBon may receive in the future. (Tab AAatfl44.) When the June 2000
Release was negotiated and closed, there was no discussion regarding the Consulting
Agreement. (Tab AA at ffi[135, 141-44; 6548 at Exs. 736, 843, 845, 846.) In fact, Viron
negotiated the release only with Palmer, Robena's manager, who had no authority to even
negotiate a release of A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement.8 (Id.)

8

In response to this fact, CoBon merely points out that it had some communications
with Palmer regarding the wording of the June 2000 Release, and that it signed the June 2000
Release for Robena. (Aplee. Br. at 33-34.) However, CoBon's communications with
(continued...)
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Another fact to which the Pennsylvania courts look is whether the only consideration
for the release was an amount for a separate injury. Here Viron's consideration for their
release was limited to precisely the amount they claimed they were owed by Robena
under the separate contract. (Tab B at 1131, Tab S at Prayer.) There was not one dollar
more for any release of their claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement. The
amount owed A&A under the Consulting Agreement is at least $22 million dollars.
Although that amount in June 2000 was still contingent upon CoBon receiving proceeds from
the six synftiel plants that had been developed by that date, the law expects some amount of
money should have been paid for A&A to release any claim to these payments over and
above the $60,000 owed for their operational services to Robena under a separate contract.
Instead the facts show A&A (as Viron) sued only for the $60,000 owed under the separate
Robena operating services contract and the settlement amount was precisely that number.
There is absolutely no basis to conclude that Viron and Robena in fact had contemplated
A&A's release of claims to future possible payment of millions of dollars under the
Consulting Agreement was covered by the June 2000 Release.
Even under CoBon's theory that the Pennsylvania action involved the April - May 1998
dispute as to whether the Consulting Agreement covered the services for what Viron was
seeking "an additional" $15,000 per month, that dispute still would have been limited to
Robena's duty to pay Viron the $ 15,000 monthly fees, rather than CoBon's duty to pay A&A

8

(...continued)
Robena were not communications with Viron. CoBon's signature merely reflected that it
remained the general partner, not that CoBon owned or controlled Robena.
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thirty percent of its proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. (Tabs F-K.) CoBon could
not have claimed in the Pennsylvania action that A&A had breached the Consulting
Agreement under CoBon's April-May 1998 position that Viron's short-term feedstock
services to Robena were required under the Consulting Agreement. As CoBon recognized,
Viron (A&A) had fully performed for Robena not only those services but also a wide-range
of additional management services that CoBon has never claimed were due under the
Consulting Agreement. (Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.)
Under the Pennsylvania rule that a release covers only such matters within the
contemplation of the parties, even a showing that Viron and Robena had contemplated
settling the issue of whether Viron's services to Robena were required under the Consulting
Agreement would not be a showing that they had contemplated settling the separate, unraised
issue of whether CoBon had to pay A&A thirty percent of its proceeds from all six developed
plants if and when CoBon began receiving those proceeds. See Cady, 220 A.2d at 374-75;
Cockeroft, 189 A. at 689; Wenger v. Ziegler, 226 A.2d 653,655 (Pa. 1967) (observing "those
cases which allow the maintenance of a suit for property damage following the settlement
of a prior claim for personal injuries sustained in the same accident where the written release
expressly precludes only a subsequent personal injury claim.").
This is amply demonstrated by the Pennsylvania decisions in Cady, discussed above,
and Cocker oft. In Cocker oft, the plaintiff had two claims against the defendant insurer under
one life insurance policy, one for a natural death payment and the other for a double
indemnity payment for accidental death. 189 A. at 689. The plaintiff had accepted a check
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from the insurer as payment of the natural death claim that stated it was "in full payment of
all claims." Id. The issue was whether the plaintiff had thereby released her double
indemnity claim, which the court stated "depends upon the facts and circumstances existing
at the time of the release." Id. The court held that the double indemnity claim had not been
released because the plaintiff had not made a demand for double indemnity and did not have
knowledge of the claim for double indemnity when the release was given. Id.
Moreover, the evidence disproves CoBon's theory that Viron' s Pennsylvania action was
against CoBon and involved a dispute under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon asserts that
it owned and controlled Robena when Viron sued Robena, but offers no support for this
assertion, which is clearly contrary to the record. (Tab AA at %\ 14; 6548 at Exs. 386,470.)
The Pennsylvania action was against Robena, not CoBon, and was only for recovery of four
months of the $15,000 fee. (Tab S.) The contractual duty to pay Viron the $15,000 monthly
fee was not created by the Consulting Agreement. (Tab C.) That duty was Robena's, not
CoBon's, under only the July 1, 1998 agreement. (TabD.) Neither the May 8,1998northe
May 18,-19 1998 letters obligated CoBon to pay Viron $15,000 per month.9 (Tabs H, K.)
It was Robena's, not CoBon's, failure to pay Viron the last four months of the $15,000 fee
that prompted Viron to file the Pennsylvania action. (Tab R.) CoBon clearly was at odds
with Robena's non-payment of the last four months of Viron's $ 15,000 per month fee. (6548
9

CoBon asserts that, under the May 8 and 18-19, 1998 letters, it "assumed" and
"guaranteed" Robena's duty to pay Viron the $15,000 monthly fee. (Aplee Br. at n.38.)
However, neither letter provided that CoBon either assumed or guaranteed Robena's duty to
pay Viron that fee. (Tabs H, K.) CoBon's sole obligation under those letters - to see that
Robena separately contracted with Viron to pay the fee - was discharged when Robena
separately contracted to retain Viron. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235(1).
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at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; Tabs M-O, Q, T-V.) CoBon did not appear in the Pennsylvania
action and stated Robena's lawyers for that action did not represent CoBon. (Tab U.)
Robena never asserted the defense that it did not have to pay the $15,000 monthly fee
because Viron's services had been required under the Consulting Agreement; this issue was
never raised nor litigated. (Tab AA at ffl[142-143.) CoBon does not challenge these facts.
Finally, other than essentially arguing that this Court should ignore the payments,
CoBon does not challenge that it made six separate payments to A&A totaling $438,000 for
A&A's share of CoBon's proceeds under the Consulting Agreement subsequent to Viron
entering into the June 2000 Release. (Tabs Y at AA004282, Z, BB at f!9; 27; 6548 at Ex.
1008.) Nor does CoBon challenge that it never relied upon Viron's release as a basis for
avoiding its duty to pay A&A until long after it had filed this lawsuit. Under Pennsylvania
law, these actions by CoBon, which were directly contrary to its belated allegation that A&A
had released their claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement, are "the strongest
indication" of the lack of merit of CoBon's allegation. See Sun Co., Inc. v. Penn. Turnpike
Comm., 708 A.2d 875, 880 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1998) (parties' conduct after entering into a
contract observed "may be the strongest indication of the [parties'] intention").
III. Even If The Fact That The June 2000 Release Did Not Expressly State It Covered
Possible Claims Accruing After It Was Executed And The Circumstances, Both
Before And After The Release Was Executed, Are Ignored, The Release's Subject
Matter Scope Could Not Be Interpreted To Cover A&A's Claims In This Lawsuit
CoBon ignores the Pennsylvania rule that releases cannot be interpreted to be broader
in scope than the scope expressly stated in the release. The oft-quoted statement of the rule
in Pennsylvania case law is that "words used in a release should not be construed to extend
19

beyond the express consideration mentioned or to operate as a release of indebtedness the
parties apparently did not intend." Flaccus v. Wood, 103 A. 549, 551 (Pa. 1918); see also
Crockroft, 189 A. at 689 (quoting same rule); In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (quoting
same rule); Cady, 220 A.2d at 374 (quoting same rule). This rule is overcome only by
express language in a release. See Flaccus, 103 A. at 551 ("This [rule against interpretation
to cover claims apparently not intended] however, is a rule of construction and can have no
application where, as in the present case, the very language used by the parties excludes its
use."); In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52 (same). This is what is meant by the fact that the
rule is only a rule of interpretation that can be overcome by express language in the release.
See Stornawaye Properties, Inc. v. Moses, 76 F. Supp.2d 607, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating
that the fact this is a rule of interpretation means "if the language and intent indicate that
even unaccrued or unknown claims are to be released, that intent will be enforced.").
Under this rule, a release bars claims only by express inclusion - the release must
expressly state a particular subject matter in order to bar claims relating to that subject matter
- and release by implication, inference or failure to expressly exclude claims is prohibited.
See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 906 A.2d 586,596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding
the release did not cover an insured's claim against his insurer as "there is no language which
explicitly releases [the insurer] from its contractual duties to [the insured].");Wenger, 226
A.2d at 654-55 ("It is inconceivable to us that a release otherwise silent may be construed so
as to deprive only one party of rights arising from a given transaction.")
Under this rule, the language of the June 2000 Release did not cover A&A's claims to

payment under the Consulting Agreement because it did not mention CoBon, the Consulting
Agreement or A&A's services to CoBon in stating the scope of its subject matter. Instead,
the expressly stated scope of the June 2000 Release was "any and all claims . . . which relate
to or arise out of any consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding the
Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." (Tab B at 1130 (emphasis added).) This expressed subject
matter - uany consulting services which have been performed by Viron regarding the Robena
Synthetic Fuel Plant" - is an exact description of Viron's services to Robena for which
it was to be paid $15,000 per month. This language refers to Viron's services to Robena
because only Viron and Robena were releasing claims. As such, under the Pennsylvania rule
set forth above, the release cannot be interpreted to cover A&A's Claims for payment of a
percentage of CoBon's proceeds under the Consulting Agreement. Those claims related to
A&A's services to CoBon regarding the development and sale of numerous actual and
potential synfuel plants, and not Viron's services to assist in the operation ofjust the Robena
plant. The release mentions no other synfuel plants or other services, so, as a matter of
Pennsylvania law, the release cannot be interpreted as a potential release of claims relating
to services other than Viron's services regarding the operation of the Robena plant.
This limited scope of the release is confirmed by other language in the release: (1) it
expressly mentioned only a dispute between Viron and Robena, which necessarily concerned
only Viron's services to Robena and not A&A's services to CoBon since Robena was not a
party to the Consulting Agreement; (2) the release stated it was mutual in scope between
Viron and Robena, which meant the release had to be limited to claims relating to Viron's
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services to Robena since only those services could have given rise to a mutual release
between Viron and Robena; and (3) Viron's consideration for their release was the exact
amount, $60,000 that Robena owed Viron for their services to Robena, which was not in any
way related to the amount owed by CoBon under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon has no
answer to this language.10
CoBon's criticism of A&A's interpretation of the scope of the release is without merit.
CoBon's theme that the June 2000 Release must be interpreted broadly to be unlimited
because it does not expressly exclude claims is directly contrary to the Pennsylvania rule that
releases are not to be construed broadly but are to be limited to their expressed scope.11
CoBon argues that the expressed subject matter "any consulting services which have
been performed by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant (the 'Project')" was a
reference to A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement because (1) A&A
assisted CoBon under the Consulting Agreement regarding the project to develop the Robena
plant, (2) this language referred to the Robena plant as a "Project" and made no distinction
between development and operations services, and (3) Viron's services to Robena allegedly

10

CoBon's only response is that A&A did not rely upon this language before the trial
court. Not only is this wrong (3391 at pp. 9-10,30), but irrelevant. This is a de novo review;
A&A preserved all possible appeal arguments by challenging below CoBon's allegation that
the June 2000 Release was a release of A&A's Claims.
11

CoBon's reliance upon Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UTApp 69,^20,
180 P.3d 765, is misplaced. Labrum applies Utah, not Pennsylvania, law. Moreover, it
merely stands for the proposition that an expressly stated broad scope of release - one which
expressly states it covers all claims between the releasing parties - should be applied to all
claims between the parties. This proposition has no application here. The release did not
expressly state it covered all claims between Viron and Robena, much less all claims between
A&A and CoBon.
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had been required under the Consulting Agreement. However, contrary to Pennsylvania law,
CoBon wants the release to be applied to a subject matter not expressed in the release. The
release's mention of only services regarding just one plant cannot be interpreted, under
Pennsylvania law, to cover A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement
because those services were for the development and sale of multiple potential and actual
synfuel plants.

See Flaccus, 103 A. at 551; In re Brill's Estate, 12 A.2d at 52;

Commonwealth, Dep'tofTransp. v. Bracken Constr. Co., 457 A.2d995,999 (Pa. Comm. Ct.
1983) ("The maxim expressio unius exclusion alterius provides that the mention of certain
items implies the purposeful exclusion of other items of the same general character.").
Moreover, the Robena plant had been operating for two years by the time Viron entering into
the June 2000 Release. Thus, the reference to the "Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" necessarily
was to the existing, operating plant, rather than the project to develop and sell the plant.
Regardless of CoBon's April-May 1998 position that Viron's short-term feedstock
services to Robena were due under the Consulting Agreement, the facts remain that Robena
separately contracted for those services, Viron went on to provide to Robena extensive
services that CoBon never claimed were required under the Consulting Agreement, and
Robena negotiated for Viron's continued services as part of the negotiation of the June 2000
Release. (Tabs D, U; 6548 at Exs. 843, 845, 846.) As such, for purposes of determining the
intended scope of the release, the short-term feedstock services in fact had been carved out
from the Consulting Agreement, and Viron and Robena in fact considered Viron's services
to Robena to be separate from A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement.
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(Id.) As such, the language "any consulting services which have been performed by Viron
regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" must have been a reference to only Viron's
consulting services to Robena.
CoBon argues that A&A' s interpretation allegedly renders the release phrase "that relate
to or arise out o f meaningless, and that this phrase allegedly "expands" the subject matter
scope of the release and must be interpreted broadly. However, A&A properly interpret that
phrase to mean a claim must relate to "any consulting services which have been performed
by Viron regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" - the expressed subject matter - in
order to have been released. See, e.g., Central States Foundation v. Balka, 590 N. W.2d 832,
837 (Neb. 1999). Contrary to CoBon's argument, the "relate to or arise out o f phrase does
not state the release's subject matter, and thus does not add claims to the intended release
beyond the claims relating to Viron's services "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant."
CoBon also argues that A&A's interpretation allegedly renders meaningless the
inclusion clause "including, without limitation, claims asserted in, or that could have been
asserted in, [Viron's Pennsylvania action]." CoBon argues this clause also allegedly adds
to the subject matter scope of the release. However, the inclusion clause did not mention
CoBon, the Consulting Agreement or any services, much less any services in addition to
those mentioned in the separate subject matter clause. Under Pennsylvania law, the inclusion
clause cannot be interpreted to expand the scope of the release beyond claims relating to
Viron's services to Robena; it merely served to illustrate particular claims that are within the
intended scope of the release. See, e.g., Schneider, 906 A.2d at 596; see also Field v. Boyer
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Co,, L.C, 952 P.2d 1078,1086-87 (Utah 1998) (applying the rule ofexpressio unus, exclusio
alterius to a statutory inclusion clause).
Moreover, Viron (A&A) did not claim, and could not have claimed, in the Pennsylvania
action that CoBon had not paid A&A their share of the proceeds received by CoBon from
all of the synfuel plants because that had not happened. At the time the Pennsylvania action
was terminated by the settlement, CoBon had not even received any proceeds to distribute
under the Consulting Agreement. Indeed, CoBon had even advanced A&A a share of future
"anticipated" proceeds. Not only had there been no breach of the Consulting Agreement to
litigate in the Pennsylvania action, there was no hint that CoBon would breach this
Agreement until two years after the settlement of the Pennsylvania action.
CoBon argues the expressed subject matter did not mention the July 1,1998 agreement.
Such a mention is not necessary to limit the release. What matters is that the expressed
subject matter did not mention CoBon or the Consulting Agreement and was an exact
description of only Viron's services to the operation of the Robena plant.
CoBon also argues that A&A's interpretation allegedly is inconsistent with CoBon's
inclusion as a "Released Party." However, CoBon's inclusion as a "Released Party" is
consistent with limiting the release to claims relating to Viron's services to Robena, as
CoBon was responsible for Robena's retention of Viron.
CoBon's interpretation fails for the same reasons as CoBon5s critique of A&A's
interpretation. CoBon somehow interprets the June 2000 Release as covering "at least" four
different subject matters, each in addition to the expressed one. (Aplee. Br. at 18-19, 27-
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28,35-36.) According to CoBon, these four different scopes amount to a general release by
A&A of all claims against CoBon.
CoBon's interpretation plainly violates the Pennsylvania rule limiting application of
releases to the scope that is expressly stated in the release. CoBon, like the trial court,
incorrectly interprets the release broadly by inference and implication.

However,

Pennsylvania law requires the release be limited to its expressed subject matter - in this case,
any and all claims relating to "any consulting services which have been performed by Viron
regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant." There is no mention of services that relate to
Viron's services to CoBon in the development and sale of multiple plants. The release
cannot be interpreted to add any other claims.
IV. CoBon's Arguments In Addition To Its Interpretation And Theory Of Application
Of The June 2000 Release To A&A's Claims Also Are Unavailing
CoBon's extensive invocation of the parol evidence rule is misguided and contrary to
its own argument.

The parol evidence rule does not prevent consideration of the

circumstances surrounding the execution of a release in order to determine the release's
intended scope; indeed, a court is required to consider the circumstances to determine that
intent. See Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 405-06 ("Under Pennsylvania law,
must look to the language of the release

[fjirst, a court

Next, in determining the intent of the parties,

a court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release."); see
also Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40 ('"The courts of Pennsylvania have traditionally determined the
effect of a release using the ordinary meaning of its language and interpreted the release as
covering only such matters as can fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the
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parties when the release was given."). The surrounding circumstances obviously are relevant
to determine the "contemplation of the parties." See Huegel v. Mifflin Constr. Co., Inc., 796
A.2d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 2002). This includes the parties' conduct after the release is
entered into, such as CoBon's payments to A&A for their share of proceeds under the
Consulting Agreement. See Sun Co., 708 A.2d at 880. Moreover, CoBon argues against
itself, as CoBon's theory for application of the release to A&A's Claims rests upon extrinsic
evidence regarding the April-May 1998 dispute and Viron's mistaken allegation in the
Pennsylvania action that the May 8, 1998 letter was their contract with Robena.
CoBon's related argument that the June 2000 Release is unambiguous also is
misguided. A&A do not claim that the June 2000 Release is ambiguous. Indeed, as argued
above, it is A&A's position that the release language unambiguously limits the release to the
services of Viron "regarding the Robena Synthetic Fuel Plant" for which it was owed the
precise settlement amount of $60,000. Nevertheless, the release does not need to be
ambiguous in order for this Court to consider its circumstances, and the circumstances
confirm the parties' intent to so limit the release. See Bickings, 82 F. Supp.2d at 405-06;
Vaughn, 648 A.2d at 40; Cockeroft, 189 A. at 689.
CoBon's arguments that the June 2000 Release is enforceable against A&A and that
CoBon may enforce it (Aplee. Br. at 32-34) are irrelevant because A&A do not challenge the
enforceability of the release. Instead, CoBon's allegation that the release bars A&A's Claims
is against the rule that, as an intended third-party beneficiary, CoBon may enforce only the
scope of release agreed to by Viron and Robena. CoBon's listing as a "Released Party" does
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not add claims to the intended release beyond claims relating to Viron's services to Robena.
CoBon has no answer to the fact that its interpretation would mean Robena had released
claims against Palmer that plainly were not intended to be released.
CoBon's argument regarding the doctrine of mistake (Aplee Br. at 50-54) is irrelevant.
A&A do not claim that the June 2000 Release is unenforceable due to a mistake. Instead,
A&A merely point out, in response to CoBon's reliance upon Viron's allegation in its
Pennsylvania complaint that the May 8,1998 letter was their contract with Robena, that this
allegation was a patent mistake. It was a patent mistake because it could not have been true.
Viron was alleging a contract between only it and Robena. (Tab S.) A purported contract
between only A&A and CoBon (the May 8, 1998 letter) could not have been a contract
between only Viron and Robena. Contrary to CoBon's argument, Viron's verification of the
allegation did not make it true.
Viron's patent mistake stands in stark contrast to the Appellees' Briefs repeated
assertion that CoBon's representations and actions were "mistakes" on CoBon's part. CoBon
claims as mistakes (1) its representations (Tab U at 4) that the July 1, 1998 agreement was
Viron's contract with Robena and that the May 18-19, 1998 letter of understanding, not the
May 8, 1998 letter, had been the operative contract leading to Robena's retention of Viron,
(2) its payments to A&A (Tabs Y at AA004282, BB at 1J49; 6548 at Ex. 1008), and (3) its
July 2002 accounting (Tab Y), wherein CoBon acknowledged both its receipt of proceeds
"for distribution" to A&A and its payments to A&A. (Aplee. Br. at n.18, n.46.) Plainly,
CoBon calls these representations and actions "mistakes" merely because they are
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inconveniently inconsistent with CoBon's allegation, raised years later, that the June 2000
Release bars A&A's Claims.

Moreover, CoBon's alleged reason for these alleged

"mistakes" - that CoBon allegedly lacked sufficient information - rings false. CoBon, of
course, identifies no information it allegedly lacked that made its representations and actions
untrue; the evidence shows that the actions and representations were true. Moreover, what
information could CoBon have lacked when CoBon was the source of all relevant knowledge
regarding its representations and actions? CoBon was the party responsible for the May 1819, 1998 letter, Robena's retention of Viron, its payments and accounting to A&A, and
manifestly knew of its receipt of distributable proceeds under the Consulting Agreement.
For the same reason, the Appellees' Brief s repeated assertions that CoBon's May 2000
and November-December 2001 checks to A&A were not payments to A&A, and that the July
1,1998 agreement was not subject of the Pennsylvania action because, if they had been, they
would have been inconsistent with the alleged release by A&A of their claims to payment
under the Consulting Agreement (Aplee. Br. at 48, n.46), are specious. As with CoBon's
"mistake" assertions, these assertions are based upon the assumption that A&A released their
claims to payment of a share of CoBon's proceeds pursuant to the Consulting Agreement.
This, of course, cannot be assumed. The relevant question is whether CoBon's payments to
A&A of eight checks totaling $438,000 between May 2000 and December 2001, which
stated they were payments under the Consulting Agreement and which CoBon accounted as
payments under the Consulting Agreement (Tab Y at AA004282; 6548 at Ex. 1008), are
consistent with A&A's position that neither A&A nor CoBon thought the Pennsylvania
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action and the settlement of that action had anything to do with CoBon's obligation to pay
A&A under the Consulting Agreement. CoBon's present assertion that these payments were
something other than payments rings untrue.
CoBon's assertion that the payments, alternatively, were either further settlement
payments or merely "loans" under Section 4.0 of the Consulting Agreement (Aplee. Br. at
n. 18) serves only to further undermine CoBon's credibility. First, even if the payments were
either settlement payments or Section 4.0 loans, the payments still would be contrary to
CoBon's allegation that the June 2000 Release bars A&A's Claims. If A&A had completely
released CoBon of all liability, then why would CoBon subsequently have made settlement
payments or loans to A&A under the Consulting Agreement? The only answer is that the
payments are "the strongest indication" that the June 2000 Release was not a release of
A&A's claims to payment under the Consulting Agreement. See Sun Co., 708 A.2d at 880.
Second, CoBon's assertions have no support in the record. No writing contemporaneous
with the payments indicates they were loans or settlement payments. CoBon did not account
for the payments as either settlement payments or loans. (Tabs Y, AA at f 95, BB at 1J1f4950.) There were no promissory notes as required under Section 4.0. (Tab BB at ^50.) The
amount of the payments far exceeded the amount of loans CoBon was obligated to provide
under Section 4.0. (Tab C at §4.0.) More importantly, CoBon told A&A they were payments
under the Consulting Agreement. (Tab BB at f49.)
CoBon's repeated references to the trial court's findings and conclusions in the March
2010 Order as authoritative are misplaced. As CoBon concedes, this Court's determination
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of whether the June 2000 Release bars A&A Claims is de novo without deference to the trial
court, thus the trial court's findings and conclusions are not authoritative. See WebBank v.
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,115, 54 P.3d 1139. Moreover, because
the trial court disposed of A&A's Claims upon a grant of CoBon's motion for summary
motion, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to A&A, the non-moving party. See
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918,919 (Utah 1964).
CoBon's assertions that it continued to own and control Robena after it sold Robena to
Providian on June 26,1998, and references to "Robena/CoBon" as if they were one and the
same, are contrary to the record. (Aplee. Br. at 13, 14-15, 45, n.30.) The contract for
CoBon's sale of Robena, and Providian's filing with the IRS to obtain certification for the
Robena plant, prove CoBon wrong. (6548 at Exs. 386, 470.) Also proving CoBon wrong
are the following facts: (1) CoBon was removed as Robena's manager and replaced by
Palmer in July 1999 at Providian's direction over CoBon's objection (Tabs M, L, AA at
ffl[l 18-123; 6548 at Ex. 736), (2) CoBon was at odds with Robena regarding Robena's nonpayment of Viron (6548 at Exs. 654, 696, 703, 731; Tabs M-O, Q, T-V), (3) CoBon
expressly stated that Robena's counsel for the Pennsylvania action did not represent CoBon
(Tab U), (4) CoBon complained to Providian regarding its lack of authority over Robena
after it had been removed as its manager (stating its position as the general partner was a
"charade") (Tab T at pp.3-4), and (4) CoBon's counsel admitted Robena no longer was a
subsidiary of CoBon after its sale to Providian (6457-6456).
CoBon repeatedly mistakenly asserts Viron's consideration for their release was not
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only payment of $60,000, but also payment of the $ 180,000 of previous payments by Robena
to Viron. (Aplee. Br. at 2,46, n.18, n.45.) The June 2000 Release expressly stated Viron's
consideration was only $60,000 (Tab B), and the previously-paid $ 180,000 of fees could not
have been consideration for Viron's release as a matter of law. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 71 ("To constitute consideration, a performance... must be bargained for.")
CoBon repeatedly misrepresents that A&A's principals testified that the June 2000
Release was a release of A&A's Claims. (Aplee. Br. at 16-17, 49-50.) None of the
testimony cited by CoBon regarded the language, circumstances or intended scope of the
release so as to be relevant. Instead, CoBon cites testimony concerning the interrelationship
of A&A's services regarding the separate projects to develop synfuel plants and the
relationship of A&A's Claims to A&A's services under the Consulting Agreement. This
testimony is irrelevant because it did not concern the intended scope of the release and the
determination of that intended scope does not turn on whether A&A' s services to CoBon may
have related to Viron's services to Robena. CoBon neither cites nor addresses the only
testimony given by A&A's principals regarding the intended scope of the release, which was
that no release of A&A's Claims was intended. (3392 at Ex. A.)
CoBon's argument that A&A were "Viron" (Aplee. Br. at 31) is misguided. This is a
conceded fact. What matters is that CoBon and Robena referred to A&A as "Viron" only
in connection with Viron' s services to Robena and Robena's $ 15,000 monthly payments, and
never regarding A&A's services to CoBon under the Consulting Agreement and CoBon's
duty to pay A&A under the Consulting Agreement (e.g., Tabs W, X, Y), which is a fact that

CoBon does not challenge.
Finally, CoBon's assertion that it seeks $60 million in damages from A&A is
inflammatory. CoBon's original or amended complaint made no such allegation and CoBon
has never provided a Rule 26 disclosure supporting such a damage claim. In contrast, A&A
have presented their $22 million damage claim in detail, with supporting evidence. (1810.)
CoBon's assertion only serves to underscore the lack of merit of its position. See Wenger,
226 A.2d at 654-55.
CONCLUSION
A&A urge this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
CoBon as to A&A's Claims and dismissal of A&A's ancillary claims, order the reinstatement
of those claims, and remand the case for further proceedings on all claims.
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